Trust
This page is rendered from a signed trust-center bundle, produced by the same command any customer can run against their own deployment.
| Bundle digest | 537ca2da02c145552a51900445aed0c809882a9f7d60e1df260dbc56924a1563 |
|---|---|
| Generated at | 2026-10-12T05:55:55.678650+00:00 |
| Freshness | Generated 2026-10-12. Stale after 2027-01-10 (90 days): past that date, do not rely on this page. |
| Signer public key | a119c531e6d7a1f60861228006a806485db1a7705092a7d7811844509d5c6e2a |
The full signed bundle is available under NDA from sales@actaseal.com. Check its digest and signature against the values above.
SBOM
Not embedded in this bundle.
Resilience drill receipts
| Drill | Result |
|---|---|
| tamper | PASS -- all injected faults detected |
| key_compromise | not included in this bundle |
| restore_corruption | not included in this bundle |
CUEC declaration
Complementary user-entity controls: what the operator of a deployment is responsible for.
| Control | Statement |
|---|---|
| key_custody | ActaSeal never holds a production signing key; the deployment operator is responsible for custody of whatever key is registered as active (KMS/HSM/offline). |
| access_review_cadence | ActaSeal provides the mechanism to record an audit-trail review (who reviewed, what window); deciding who reviews and how often is the operator's own control. |
| retention_profile | How long records are retained is the operator's choice, made by selecting a retention profile (or leaving it unset); ActaSeal does not impose a retention period of its own. |
| tsa_pool | Which RFC 3161 timestamp authorities are trusted is the operator's choice; ActaSeal does not bind the operator to a fixed set of timestamp authorities. |
| approver_role_assignment | Which role is required to approve a given policy decision is set by the operator in the policy; ActaSeal refuses an approval from anyone who does not hold that role, but does not choose who holds it. |
| network_component_selection_under_airgap | Whether network-touching components (S3 Object Lock anchor, Rekor, RFC 3161 TSA pool, WorkOS/Logto SSO, SMTP/Resend email) are enabled is the operator's choice; when the operator turns on air-gapped mode, ActaSeal refuses each by name rather than silently degrading. |
Security questionnaires
Completed CAIQ-Lite and SIG-Lite questionnaires are available under NDA from sales@actaseal.com.
Deletion and key compromise
Personal data in the sealed dispute-context section of a record can be erased by destroying the data subject's key; the ledger still verifies afterwards. Identifiers sent with an action, approver identity and free-text reasons cannot be erased. An active legal hold blocks erasure. See data retention and deletion for the full statement, and if a signing key is compromised for what happens to a key and the receipts it signed.